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Chirac and ‘la Franc¸afrique’: No Longer
a Family Affair
Tony Chafer
Since political independence, France has maintained a privileged sphere of influence—the
so-called ‘pre´ carre´’—in sub-Saharan Africa, based on a series of family-like ties with its
former colonies. The cold war provided a favourable environment for the development of
this special relationship, as the USA saw the French presence in this part of the world as
useful for the containment of Communism. However, following the end of the cold war,
France has had to adapt to a new international policy environment that is more
competitive and less conducive to the maintenance of such family-like ties. This article
charts the evolution of Franco-African relations in an era of globalisation, as French
governments have undertaken a hesitant process of policy adaptation since the mid-1990s.
Unlike decolonisation in Indochina and Algeria, the transfer of power in Black Africa
was largely peaceful; as a result, there was no rupture of relations with the former
colonial power. On the contrary, the years after independence were marked by an
intensification of the links with France. Official rhetoric often referred to the great
Franco-African family and the term ‘la Franc¸afrique’ testified to a symbiotic
relationship in which ‘Africa is experienced in French representations as a natural
extension where the Francophone world and Francophilia merge’ (Bourmaud, 2000).
In fact, a wide variety of terms have been coined to describe this special relationship:
the countries concerned have traditionally been described as ‘les pays du champ’ or
France’s ‘pre´ carre´’, while the network of actors linking France to Africa have been
variously characterised as ‘la Franc¸afrique’, ‘le Paris-village africain’, the ‘complexe
franco-africain’ and ‘l’E´tat franco-africain’.1
This article will identify the key features of the international context that made the
development of this special ‘family’ relationship possible and review the main
distinctive characteristics of French African policy in the immediate post-colonial
period. It will then explain why the end of the cold war and the challenges of
globalisation made a new approach to Franco-African relations indispensable, even if
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some within France’s African policy-making community apparently believed for a
few years that it was possible to continue much as before. The 1994 genocide in
Rwanda, and France’s implication in the events leading up to it, finally destroyed any
such illusions and provoked a recognition that its traditional approach to African
policy no longer brought the same returns to France as it had in the past. The
hesitant attempts by Paris to develop a new African policy against the backdrop of a
much changed international situation will then be examined, firstly during Chirac’s
septennat (1995–2002), much of which was marked by cohabitation with Socialist
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, then more forthrightly but in practice just as
uncertainly, under the stewardship of his activist Foreign Affairs Minister Dominique
de Villepin during the early years of his second presidential mandate. In conclusion,
it will be shown that, despite this renewed activism since 2002, the pressures on, and
uncertainties surrounding, France’s ‘family’ relationship with Africa have not
diminished.
The International Context of French African Policy 1960 –90
The smooth political transition in Black Africa was facilitated by the fact that, after the
Second World War, a francophone elite had emerged that was dependent for its status
and position of influence on France. This was the essential prerequisite for the
continuation of close relations between the former me´tropole and its ex-colonies, as it
was to this loyal elite that France was able, for the most part, to transfer power at
independence (see Chafer, 2002a).
As the heads of small, weak, fragmented, multi-ethnic states with little in the way of
natural resources to exploit, no trained army and a small local police force, the new
political leaders had no interest in breaking off relations with the former colonial
power. Moreover, self-interest was underpinned by cultural and emotional affinities.
Educated in French schools, they cut their political teeth in the National Assembly of
the Fourth Republic, where many of them had sat as de´pute´s and in some cases even
served as ministers. During this time, they also formed friendships with French
political leaders and officials and had no interest or desire to withdraw their
collaboration at independence. The two best-known examples of this stance were
Le´opold Se´dar Senghor and Fe´lix Houphoue¨t-Boigny, respectively the first presidents
of Senegal and Coˆte d’Ivoire. For its part, France under General de Gaulle had no
desire to break its links with Africa. No enthusiast for colonial rule, de Gaulle
nonetheless saw the maintenance of a sphere of influence in Africa as crucial to French
grandeur, to his vision of France as a world power in the post-colonial world.
The attitude of the USA was of crucial importance here. Against the background of
the cold war, Washington saw France’s continuing presence, in a part of the world that
it did not know well, as desirable to ensure that the region did not fall into the clutches
of Moscow. Thus, while the USA saw the maintenance of a French sphere of influence
as essential to the containment of communism in Africa, France saw its pre´ carre´ as a
means of containing ‘Anglo-Saxon’—for which read American and British—influence.
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As far as British influence was concerned, France need not have worried as British
governments had decided that western Africa was peripheral to its strategic priorities
in the post-colonial world, leaving France as the only major power in the region. Thus
emerged a division of responsibilities that suited both France and the USA for the
duration of the cold war, but which began to break down once the cold war had ended.
This de facto partnership has given way to a more competitive, and conflictual,
relationship and Franco-American divisions over the appropriate response to the 11
September 2001 attacks on New York have further exacerbated latent tensions between
the two countries in Africa.
‘Keeping it in the Family’
If a favourable international context was the essential prerequisite for the successful
conduct of French African policy, it does not help us to understand why it was so
successful for so long. The essential point here is the multi-layered approach, which
combined an impressive array of ‘official’ policy instruments with a complex range of
unofficial, family-like, and often covert, relationships (see Me´dard, 1997, pp. 22–24).
The close inter-linking of these features and support for them at the summit of the
French state was the key to their success. The official conduits of Franco-African
relations included the Franc Zone, which tied the French franc to the currencies of
over a dozen African countries at a fixed rate; the existence of an independent Ministry
of Cooperation, with a seat on the Council of Ministers, which was both a visible sign
of France’s continuing commitment to Africa and an important channel for French
development aid (two-thirds of which went to France’s former colonies in Black
Africa); the cultural, technical and military cooperation accords, which most ex-
colonies signed with France on independence and which provided for French teachers
and other specialists, such as military advisers, to work for African governments and
set the framework within which French military interventions were undertaken; and
finally, the fact that, with the establishment of the Fifth Republic, African policy
effectively became the domaine re´serve´ of the president (Chafer, 2002b, p. 346). These
official links were accompanied by a range of semi-official and unofficial family-like
ties that are epitomised by the Franco-African summits, instituted in 1973, which
bring the French president together with African and French political leaders in an
annual celebration of their special relationship. Their meetings have traditionally been
more like a family gathering than an official summit meeting, as there is no published
agenda and they issue no final communique´.
Three other features were key to the success of French African policy during this
period. First, the political will existed across the political establishment, on both the
Left and Right, to pursue an active, interventionist policy in Africa, unencumbered by
feelings of colonial guilt that for many years held Britain back from playing a more
prominent role on the continent. To understand the political motivation behind the
determination to carve out a sphere of influence in Africa after independence, we
need to return to the Suez crisis of 1956. The US withdrawal of support for
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the Franco-British military operation in Suez served to convince France’s governing
elites that, if France were to remain a world power, then it would need to achieve
greater autonomy of action vis-a`-vis the USA. Thus, whereas Britain decided it could
only remain a world power by hanging on to Washington’s coat-tails, the French
decisions to develop an independent nuclear strike force, to build a strong Europe on
the foundation of Franco-German cooperation and to maintain a privileged sphere of
influence in Africa were the cornerstones of de Gaulle’s policy to maintain France’s
world status—its grandeur—in the post-colonial era, the dawn of which he now
increasingly saw as inevitable. Black Africa was thus one of the key pillars of his
strategy of grandeur and he, like the French political leaders who came after him,
mobilised an impressive array of policy instruments to ensure its implementation. The
strategy of grandeur was the product of a concept of power that was centred on an
active, interventionist nation-state and linked to territorial control and military
strength. The roots of this concept of power lay in the colonial era but they continued
to be manifest in francophone Black Africa well into the post-colonial era: indeed, the
frequency of French military interventions, an average of one a year from 1960 until
the mid-1990s, showed that France continued to see itself as ‘the guarantor of stability
and a hegemonic power’ in the region (Bru¨ne, 1994, p. 56). It was this activist,
interventionist view of the French state that formed the basis of the ‘Gaullist
consensus’ on African policy, which stretched across the political spectrum of France’s
governing parties from the Right to the Socialists.
Secondly, French governments during this period developed a distinctive
discourse on Africa to justify their policy to public opinion both at home and
abroad. This centred on the newly coined concept of coope´ration. Untranslatable
into English, the term denotes something specifically French that is both far more
wide-ranging in its compass and more ambiguous in its meaning than its most
commonly used English equivalents: development aid or assistance. First, it is linked
to the spread of French influence across the world. As Prime Minister Georges
Pompidou put it in 1964: ‘la politique de coope´ration est la suite de la politique
d’expansion de l’Europe au XIXe sie`cle’ (cited in Michel, 1993, p. 221). In this
respect, it is a means of promoting French language and culture, of securing markets
for French goods and, most importantly, of projecting French grandeur. Secondly,
there was, contained within the notion of coope´ration, a recognition that this could
no longer be achieved within a colonial context. France, as de Gaulle himself had
acknowledged, needed to move away from the outdated colonial system towards
‘une coope´ration fe´conde et amicale’ (de Gaulle, 1970, p. 263). Finally, implicit in
the notion of coope´ration is a sense of France’s ongoing historic responsibility to
promote the development of its former colonial ‘family’, but based henceforth on
the idea of a partnership between sovereign states for their mutual benefit. As a
discourse, it simultaneously appealed to notions of grandeur, to pragmatic self-
interest, to France’s sense of historic responsibility and to moral imperatives of
solidarity with one’s fellow human beings in poor countries, and underpinned the
notion of a special ‘family’ relationship with Africa.
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Thirdly, and most importantly, the close interlinking of state, party and personal
interests, and indeed often the blurring of the boundaries between them, were crucial
to the success of this relationship, which was underpinned by a series of re´seaux
(personal networks).2 Its defining feature was that, although it was state centred
insofar as it depended on state-to-state relations, it was underpinned by a dense web of
personalised, family-like relations. The re´seaux were pioneered most notoriously by
Jacques Foccart, who combined his role as de Gaulle’s right-hand man in the Gaullist
movement, and subsequently the Gaullist party, with his positions as special adviser to
the President on African affairs and his responsibility for liaison with the secret
services. Until his removal by President Giscard d’Estaing, he was thus at the centre of
a series of informal and formal networks that allowed him ‘to make use of both
political contacts and business connections to further his influence in French circles,
while his official responsibilities allowed him systematically to cultivate the friendship
of African leaders’ (Me´dard, 1997, p. 25). The point of convergence of these networks
was at the very summit of the French state, within the E´lyse´e palace itself, which meant
that Foccart enjoyed a position of exceptional power. He was able to mobilise, when
necessary, the considerable economic, diplomatic and military resources of the French
state in support of his initiatives, while his political position provided cover and
legitimacy for his various activities, both legal and illicit. The funds to support these
networks and their activities came largely from the coope´ration budget, which was
subject neither to parliamentary scrutiny nor public debate but was simply rubber-
stamped by the National Assembly (Bossuat, 2003, p. 433). This lack of accountability,
another trait of the ‘family’ relationship, led to corruption, with politicians and
officials becoming involved in business activities that often took the form of state
racketeering.3
It was thus a special kind of relationship, not at all in line with true French
Republican ideals, in which the interlinking of state, party and personal interests made
it possible to present a set of policies and interventions as serving the wider national
interest, that in practice brought major benefits to particular interest groups and small
sections of the population in both France and Africa. The international prestige of the
Gaullist state was enhanced by the group of loyal allies in Africa that looked to France
for support and sustenance, while the Gaullist party received much of its funding from
the recycling of part of the coope´ration budget, which found its way back to the party’s
coffers via Africa. A number of French companies, notably the state-owned oil
company, Elf, which was established under de Gaulle with a brief to secure French
access to oil, achieved the strategic objective set for it in Africa and also brought
handsome returns to its directors and funding for the Gaullist party.4 For African
leaders, on the other hand, membership of the Franco-African ‘family’ provided
economic, political, and if necessary military, support, from which they and the small
French-speaking elites to which they belonged were the main beneficiaries.
This interlinking of state, party and personal interests in French African policy
outlived de Gaulle and ensured that a wide range of political and economic
stakeholders had a vested interest in maintaining France’s pre´ carre´ in Africa.
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However, the international and domestic political conditions in which this
relationship had developed changed radically in the 1990s.
French African Policy in the Global Era
A favourable political environment, together with the political will and resources to
sustain it, ensured that the special relationship described above endured for more than
30 years after independence. However, all of these began to be in short supply in the
1990s. The end of the cold war provoked a rapid transition to multi-partyism in
Africa, creating a less stable policy environment. The political fragmentation and
increased conflict that ensued in several west and central African states, combined with
the debt crisis and economic failure, threatened French influence and increased the
potential cost to France of maintaining its pre´ carre´. As a result, the restoration of
stability and security became an overriding priority, not only for France but for the
international community in general. Against this background, traditional, French-
style unilateral interventions in the politics of African states became fraught with risk,
as the situations in Rwanda (1990–94), the Central African Republic (1995–96) and
the former Zaire (1994–97) demonstrated.
Simultaneously with these developments, the policy environment became more
competitive as globalisation gathered pace and the major industrial powers jockeyed
for economic and political advantage, no longer constrained by the imperatives of cold
war politics. In this new environment France has grown increasingly concerned about
‘Anglo-Saxon’ activity in Africa. The Clinton-backed African Growth and
Opportunity Act (2000) sought to promote the development of new markets and
investment opportunities for US business. This increased interest in Africa did not
translate into any coherent policy to extend US diplomatic or military influence, but
did give rise to a perception in Paris of growing competition between French and US
economic interests on the continent.5 French fears of increased US activity in Africa
were further exacerbated in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, as the USA turned to
Africa in its search for more secure sources of oil than its traditional Middle East
suppliers.6 France is also concerned at the renewal of US political interest in Africa,
born out of the Bush Administration’s war on terror and exemplified by the State
Department’s 2004 Pan-Sahel Initiative. At the same time, however, the new, post-
1990 world order that is driven by economic globalisation and dominated by the
ideology of international liberalism has created new opportunities for French business,
notably through the privatisation of public services, the award of construction
contracts and the winning of concessions to exploit Africa’s agricultural, oil and
mineral resources. In this context, the exercise of French military and political power
in support of political allies, which derives from the notion of an interventionist state
and is the traditional hallmark of the French presence in Africa, has become less
important as a means of projecting French influence.
Finally, the European Union (EU) has become increasingly important as a policy
actor in Africa (Krause, 2003). Following the mid-term review of Lome´ IV (1995),
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political conditionality became part of EU development policy and was fully
integrated as one of the pillars of EU development policy with the signing of the
Cotonou Agreement in 2002. This was new, since Lome´ I–III had been presented as
‘technical’ agreements covering trade and development assistance between the EU and
African, Caribbean, Pacific countries. The political dimension was seen as the domain
of the member states. By the end of the 1990s, this had irrevocably changed and the
EU, which now explicitly sought to promote the spread of Western-style multi-
partyism and liberal democratic institutions through its development policy,
increasingly encroached on what had been the policy-making prerogatives of the
member states. This further reduced the space for a distinctive French national
approach to African relations of the type described above.
Alongside these international developments, changes in Paris were also affecting the
context within which French policy-making on Africa was formulated. First, in the
aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent democratic revolutions in
Central and Eastern Europe, questions began to be asked in France about the
desirability of maintaining close relations with authoritarian regimes that had poor
human rights records. Questions were also asked about the value and effectiveness of
French development aid, which had signally failed to promote economic take-off in
Africa despite 30 years of coope´ration policy (see for example Brunel, 1993). However,
it was French implication in the events leading up to and in the aftermath of the
Rwanda genocide of 1994 that provoked the most far-reaching re-evaluation of French
African policy. Although domestic criticism of French involvement in Rwanda was, as
usual, relatively muted, there was widespread, and well-publicised, condemnation of
France’s role by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (see in
particular Human Rights Watch, 1995). As a result, members of France’s governing
elites and sections of the French press increasingly questioned the benefits to France of
the relationship (see for example Rocard, 1998).
Secondly, the post-1990 era saw the breakdown of the ‘Gaullist consensus’ that had
been the foundation stone of French African policy and thus of ‘la Franc¸afrique’. This
has manifested itself at a number of levels. First, the period has been marked by two
periods of political ‘cohabitation’, between a president of the Left and a prime minister
of the Right (Mitterrand–Balladur, 1993–95) and then between a president of the
Right and a prime minister of the Left (Chirac–Jospin, 1997–2002). In each case, the
prime ministers, who were keen to assert their authority over African policy,
challenged the Fifth Republic tradition of Franco-African relations as a presidential
domaine re´serve´ (see below). Secondly, the Gaullist movement has fragmented and
with it the Gaullist re´seau that was one of the key pillars of ‘la Franc¸afrique’. For
example, the falling out between Chirac’s and Balladur’s supporters lay behind the
bringing to trial of directors of the Elf oil company.7 The break-up of the Foccart
re´seau into competing networks run by supporters of Mitterrand, Chirac and former
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua explains their transformation from a network whose
central raison d’eˆtre was the promotion of a certain notion of the French state and
French grandeur (while also promoting their own private interests), into private
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lobbies ‘that pursue their own objectives, whether or not these objectives implicate the
state’ (Smith & Glaser, 1997, p. 25). This growing competition between rival re´seaux
and the corruption to which it gave rise are an essential backdrop to understanding
how the system degenerated and crisis emerged in the 1990s.
Thirdly, the French political class itself has fractured. The prevailing ideology of
economic neo-liberalism and the promotion of market values, competition and
private enterprise represent a challenge to the notion of an interventionist state that
was central to the political culture of France’s governing elites of both Left and Right
until the mid-1980s (Bourmaud, 2000). This consensus has fragmented, with the
result that, even though France’s governing elites continue to believe in the need to
promote ‘une certaine ide´e de la France’, they are nonetheless divided between those
who accept the values of economic liberalism and are prepared to accept a less
interventionist role for the state and those who, while recognising the constraints
imposed by economic globalisation, nonetheless continue to believe strongly in the
need for state activism to defend French interests, especially in France’s ‘backyard’, its
privileged sphere of influence in Africa. This has had consequences for French African
policy, as the former group attach less importance to ‘old-style’ French interventions
and manifestations of French power in Africa than the latter. The demands of
realpolitik ensure that divisions between these groups are neither straightforward nor
clear-cut when it comes to making decisions on specific issues, yet this fragmenting of
the ideology of France’s governing elites is an important element in any explanation of
the difficulties, and the political tensions, that have underpinned French attempts to
define a new African policy since the mid-1990s. It is also a key underlying factor
behind the sapping of the political will to sustain ‘la Franc¸afrique’.
Finally, as the political will to sustain France’s African pre´ carre´ declined, so also
were the resources available to maintain it eroded. There was a sharp reduction in the
bilateral development aid budget between 1995 and 2001, in both value (down from
4,137 billion euros to 2,653 billion) and percentage terms (the proportion of bilateral
aid to multilateral aid went down from 73% to 59.7%) (Observatoire Franc¸ais de la
Coope´ration Internationale [OFCI], 2003). The result was a very significant decline in
the resources available from the French state to maintain the Franco-African special
relationship and the re´seaux that both underpinned and lived off this relationship.
From Mitterrand to Chirac: The Search for a New African Policy
President Mitterrand appeared to signal a significant change in French African policy,
when he promised in his speech to the 1990 La Baule Franco-African summit that
French aid would henceforth be distributed as a priority to countries making progress
towards democratisation. Yet most commentators are agreed that in practice nothing
much changed in French policy, initially at least (Cumming, 1996). The last years of
the Mitterrand presidency were thus in many ways a period during which French
African policy marked time. The main exception was the decision to devalue the
Communaute´ Financie`re d’Afrique (CFA) franc by 50%, which was taken by his
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Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, in January 1994. This produced an immediate
reduction in the cost to France of its African policy. Balladur was also in the forefront
of those promoting the so-called ‘Abidjan doctrine’, whereby budgetary support for
African states became conditional upon the prior conclusion of structural adjustment
agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This
required states in the pre´ carre´ to restructure their economies in accordance with the
principles of international liberalism (Bourmaud, 1996). Importantly, the adoption of
the Abidjan doctrine marked an end to one of the distinguishing features of the
Franco-African ‘family’ relationship—the provision of financial assistance to the pays
du champ without any formal economic conditions attached. From now on, only
countries undertaking an IMF/World Bank-sponsored reform programme were
eligible for aid.
If the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc was the first significant new policy
initiative towards Africa in response to the post-cold war policy environment, it was
the Rwanda genocide of that year that marked the real watershed in French African
policy. France had provided support to Habyarimana’s extremist Hutu regime from
1990–94, then departed along with other Western powers when the genocide started,
and subsequently sent a military intervention force to Rwanda in the summer of that
year. Presented as a humanitarian intervention to stop further killing and save
lives, Operation Turquoise was widely criticised by international NGOs for, in
practice, providing a safe haven and an escape route for the ge´nocidaires into Zaire. As
a result, old-style, unilateral French military interventions in Africa were discredited.
Not only this, but France could do nothing to prevent the English-speaking Rwanda
Patriotic Front from taking power in Kigali. The result was the replacement of a pro-
French government with a new government that was hostile to France and the loss of
Rwanda from the Franco-African ‘family’.8
It was now clear that African policy as traditionally conceived was no longer
bringing the expected benefits to France. A new approach was required that would
meet the needs of the new policy environment while preserving French power and
influence on the continent. The election of Jacques Chirac to the presidency in 1995
provided the opportunity for just such a change. Chirac had a long history of interest
and involvement in Africa, which dated back to his period as a civil servant in Algiers
during the Algerian war (Giesbert, 1997). However, his first initiatives on Africa
following his election suggested continuity with the past rather than change.
A consistent feature of Gaullist and neo-Gaullist foreign policy is to present France
as a champion of Third World, and in particular African, interests. In line with this
tradition, Chirac continued to make visits to Africa during the period of cohabitation.
His first official visit overseas as president was to France’s traditional allies in Africa:
Morocco, reportedly to thank King Hassan II for his donation of five million euros to
his election campaign, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal (Verschave, 2002, p. 197).
A year later, on the occasion of Hassan’s official visit to Paris, Chirac raised a few
eyebrows when he praised the king for his human rights record, at the very time when
he was being criticised for his treatment of political prisoners in the Tazmamart
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prison.9 In that year he also went to Namibia, Angola, South Africa and Mozambique,
and in 1999 to Guinea, Togo, Cameroon and Nigeria, which he supported as a future
permanent member of the UN Security Council. Chirac was responsible for the 1997
decision to support Zaire’s dictatorial leader, President Mobutu, long after his other
traditional backers, including the USA and the former colonial power Belgium, had
decided to abandon him to his fate. The result was French diplomatic isolation
(Chafer, 2002b, p. 349). Also in 1997 he was accused of backing the return to power of
his friend and ally, the former Congolese dictator Denis Sassou Nguesso, after France
had fallen out with the incumbent president Patrick Lissouba, whom it had not
forgiven for trying to loosen the stranglehold of the Elf oil company over his country
when he became president in 1992.10 And he refused to support the proposed merger
of the Ministry of Cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was seen by
its proponents as essential if France was successfully to modernise its African policy.
However, these early signs of interest in Africa from Chirac could not conceal the
significance of the changes that had taken place in the international and domestic
political environment in which French African policy was made. Unilateral military
actions were now far riskier in the context of state fragmentation and even collapse in
Africa, because of the risk of being drawn into the continent’s internal conflicts. Thus,
after a series of mutinies by the Central African Republic army in 1996, Chirac
supported the Government’s decision to close France’s military base there, to avoid its
troops being drawn into the imbroglio in that country.11 Moreover, although France
supported the embattled Mobutu to the end, it did not send a military force, partly
because of the political risks to France and partly because such unilateral interventions
no longer benefited from international acquiescence in the aftermath of Rwanda.
With the advent of a renewed period of cohabitation in 1997 that saw President
Chirac forced to share power with Socialist Prime Minister Jospin for the full five-year
period of legislature, the notion of Africa as a presidential domaine re´serve´, where the
President both called the policy shots and was the unchallenged spokesman on French
African policy, was again called into question. One illustration of this was Jospin’s
refusal to send troops to Coˆte d’Ivoire in December 1999 to support President Konan
Be´die´, who had just been overthrown in a military coup. President Chirac’s African
adviser, Michel Dupuch, wanted to intervene in support of Be´die´, who, with French
support, had succeeded long-time French ally Fe´lix Houphoue¨t-Boigny as President in
1993. But Jospin overruled him.12 This went against the tradition of African policy as a
presidential domaine re´serve´ and can be seen as a further step towards the
normalisation of French policy and away from the traditional family-like relationship.
The domestic and international pressures described above have made it more
difficult for France not only to act alone but also to speak with a distinctive voice on
Africa. On the international stage, France has, quite logically, made itself the champion
of multilateralism. Not only is this the only way for a medium-sized power that does
not enjoy a special relationship with the USA to maintain influence, but also burden-
sharing represents the only possibility to meet the costs of its desire to maintain a
global role, in a world in which the USA is the only superpower.13 This is reflected in
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its new approach to Africa. Alongside its Abidjan doctrine, which aims to share the
economic costs of its African policy, France launched a policy initiative in 1997 with a
view to spreading the risks of its military policy in Africa. Called RECAMP
(Renforcement des Capacite´s Africaines de Maintien de la Paix), this French-
sponsored peace-keeping programme aims at enabling Africans to take greater
responsibility for the maintenance of security and participate more fully in peace-
keeping on the continent. At the level of the EU, France emerged in the late 1990s as
the largest contributor to the European Development Fund (OFCI, 2003),
a development motivated in part by its intention to retain significant influence over
EU policy on Africa; and at the 1998 Franco-British summit in St Malo it announced
its intention of cooperating more closely with the UK on African policy. Finally,
France, along with the UK, was one of the key sponsors of the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a multilateral initiative launched in 2001 to mobilise
resources for a new development partnership between the West and Africa. In February
2002 Chirac organised a conference of 13 African heads of state in support of the
NEPAD.14 He also regularly spoke up for African interests in international fora such as
the UN, G8 and EU meetings. All of these represent clear signs of France’s decision to
move away from a unilateralist approach to Africa. While these changes were essential
if France were to maintain its influence on the continent, they were also indicative of
the end of the old-style ‘family’ relationship and of a specifically French approach to,
and discourse on, Africa.
France’s new African policy was summed up by Prime Minister Jospin in a speech in
Dakar in December 1997 as ‘not to do less but to do better’. Yet, as Rachel Utley has
shown, it was at the time ‘hard to avoid the impression that France does wish to do less,
and to gain greater credit for it’ (Utley, 2002, p. 146). The French military presence in
Africa was being scaled down, the will to intervene had diminished, and French
bilateral development aid, for so long one of the cornerstones of its coope´ration policy,
underwent a sustained decline during Jospin’s premiership.15 At the same time, he
presided over the absorption of the Ministry for Cooperation, which had traditionally
been considered by African leaders of the pays du champ as ‘their’ ministry, into the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a measure that Chirac had opposed only two years
earlier.16 Finally, the notion of pays du champ, considered too redolent of the outdated
notion of a French colonial ‘backyard’, was abandoned in favour of the Zone de
solidarite´ prioritaire (ZSP). All countries in the zone, which was extended to include
54 countries in the developing world, of which 44 were in Africa, would henceforth be
eligible for French aid. This further diluted the family-like relationship with Africa, as
the 44 included former British and Portuguese colonies that were not part of France’s
traditional sphere of influence.
Renewed French Activism in Africa Since the 2002 Elections
Within six months of his re-election, Chirac’s new Foreign Minister, Dominique
de Villepin, flew to Madagascar to repair relations with the new President,
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Marc Ravalomanana, and shortly afterwards organised a business conference in Paris
for the new Malagasy Prime Minister to brief investors. He also moved to cement
relations with France’s longstanding ally and oil supplier, Gabon, and visited six West
African countries in an effort to break the deadlock in war-torn Coˆte d’Ivoire. As for
Chirac, he went to South Africa for the Johannesburg Earth Summit, where he
declared his support for South Africa as a future permanent member of the UN
Security Council, then in 2003 to Mali and Niger. In the same year he took the
exceptional step of inviting African leaders to the G8 Evian summit. Among those
invited were presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of
Nigeria, with whom he is in regular telephone contact.17
This new pattern of presidential visits and contacts is symptomatic of a move away
from the traditional pre´ carre´ as the privileged sphere of French influence in Africa,
based on political-military power and the disbursement of public development aid
through a policy of coope´ration. This is the product, firstly, of the new policy
environment that has resulted from globalisation, which has led to a reassessment of
French interests in Africa. These are increasingly conceived primarily in terms of
economic interest, and especially the exploitation of business opportunities and the
guaranteeing of secure access to strategically important raw materials, notably oil. This
lies behind the growing importance attached to South Africa, Nigeria and previously
Angola in Franco-African relations.18 President Mbeki’s visit to Paris in November
2003 and his invitation to address the National Assembly, a rare privilege for visiting
heads of state, were clear indications of the growing prominence in Franco-African
relations of South Africa, which is now France’s most important trading partner on the
continent. The focus on business links is a key feature of France’s new African policy:
Chirac’s invitation to 10 business leaders to accompany him on his visit to Mali and
Niger and his decision to host a reception for business leaders on the occasion of
President Mbeki’s official visit to Paris were entirely in keeping with this new emphasis
in French African policy. Reflecting this, a key focus of the work of the new Direction
ge´ne´rale de la Coope´ration internationale et du De´veloppement (DGCID), which was
formed out of a merger of the old Cooperation Ministry and the cultural relations
department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, is to assist French consultants and
companies to win multilateral contracts; and at the E´lyse´e, the Service Afrique
(formerly Foccart’s Africa cell) now employs a former Banque de France man, Bernard
Diguet, with a brief to look after French business interests in Africa. Indeed, French
companies such as Bouygues, Bollore´ and the Lyonnaise des Eaux have been very
successful in winning contracts for major African development projects and in taking
over public service utilities that IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment
programmes have forced African governments to privatise.19
At the same time, the increased priority attached to economic and business links is
accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the promotion of French culture. Thus, the
DGCID has prioritised the promotion of French culture over development issues, a
point that is reflected both in the organisational structure of the new Directorate—it
has three sections working on cultural promotion and only one working in
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the development field proper—and in its spending, only some 20% of which goes to
the latter.20
Secondly, the move away from the pre´ carre´ as the focus of French African policy is
the product of changed realities in Africa. In the context of state fragmentation and
collapse, privileged bilateral relations with individual countries are increasingly
unlikely to guarantee stability and security, as the problems in Coˆte d’Ivoire and the
Great Lakes have demonstrated. As we have seen, old-style, unilateral, military
interventions were discredited by the widely criticised interventions in Rwanda from
1990–94 and have largely ceased, to be replaced by regionally based, peace-keeping
and peace enforcement initiatives.21 It is now recognised that external interventions, in
order to be effective, need to take place at the regional, rather than individual country,
level.22 The French-led RECAMP initiative, which is intended to provide support for
regional solutions to Africa’s security problems, is an attempt to address this issue,
while providing a vehicle for maintaining French influence on the continent. There is
also a recognition that, if France wishes to achieve its aim of promoting security and
stability as a prerequisite for development, this can only be achieved by cultivating
relations with the whole of Africa rather than through an exclusive relationship with a
privileged pre´ carre´. Thus, for example, the annual Franco-African summits are no
longer confined to the pre´ carre´: every African president, except Colonel Gaddafi
but including, to the UK’s dismay, Robert Mugabe, was invited to attend the 2003
summit in Paris.
The third sign of France’s new approach to Africa is the continuing uncertainty
over the future size of the aid budget, the traditional cornerstone of its politique de
coope´ration. President Chirac pledged at the 2002 Johannesburg summit that France
would raise aid levels to the UN target figure of 0.7% of gross national product by
2012. Official figures do, moreover, appear to suggest an increase in the aid budget
since 2001. Yet similar promises of dramatic increases in aid have been made, and
broken, many times before, notably under Mitterrand; and closer scrutiny tells us
that most, if not all, of the latest increase is in practice being used for debt reduction,
the so-called C2D (contrats de´sendettement-de´veloppement) programme, while
traditional French allies such as Senegal have seen the amount of aid they receive
decline substantially.23 Of the five countries that have so far signed C2D agreements
with France, none belongs to the traditional pre´ carre´, and of the seven expected to
qualify in 2004, only Cameroon and Madagascar are pays du champ.24 Not only has
the aid budget declined, but the French coope´ration effort has been further hampered
since the DGCID took over the work of the old coope´ration ministry by the
haemorrhaging of personnel who used to work in development cooperation. These
staff often had a deep knowledge of, and commitment to, Africa and formed part of
the dense web of ties that bound France to Africa. So too did coope´rants, many of
whom worked in Africa as an alternative to military service. Their number has also
declined dramatically in recent years, representing a further erosion of the family-like
links that used to exist between France and Africa. Moreover, the coope´rants who
have been lost to Africa have not been replaced by an influx of volunteers working
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for French NGOs. French coope´ration policy has typically focused on state-to-state
aid and the Government remains reluctant to work with civil society actors in the
way that successive governments have in the UK. French governments have never
embraced the idea of involving civil society actors and NGOs in the development
process; indeed, the proportion of French aid to Africa channelled through NGOs,
which in any case traditionally represents a very small proportion of French aid, is
currently in decline, both in volume and as a proportion of total aid.25 The reduction
in state support for Africa has not therefore been compensated by increased
involvement at the level of civil society; France has no equivalent of the Peace Corps
and USAID, which maintain a significant US presence on the ground in Africa
promoting grassroots development initiatives.
Conclusion
The Franco-African special relationship, encapsulated in the term ‘la Franc¸afrique’,
emerged in a specific historical context that came to an end in the 1990s. The defining
feature of this relationship was that it was state centred, although it was
operationalised through a dense web of personal ties and affinities and underpinned
by a series of semi-official and unofficial re´seaux, such as that coordinated for many
years by Jacques Foccart. This article has shown that the international and domestic
context that sustained the relationship for so many years has now changed, with the
inevitable result that the nature of the relationship itself has also changed. Today,
economic and business links, combined with a renewed emphasis on cultural
rayonnement, have increasingly replaced state-to-state links, that were rooted in the
projection of French power through political and military activism, as the hallmarks of
the Franco-African relationship.
Yet at one level, old ‘statist’ habits die hard and France’s governing elites remain
reticent about embracing wholeheartedly the agenda of international economic
liberalisation, in African policy as in other areas of policy. There is still an Africa cell at
the E´lyse´e, with advisers whose brief is to advise Chirac on African policy: no other
continent receives this special presidential attention. The cell also plays a key role in
maintaining France’s links with its closest allies in Africa: Bongo (Gabon), Eyadema
(Togo) and Biya (Cameroon) are three examples of African leaders who continue to
occupy a special position in French African relations. In presidential speeches, the
discourse of the special relationship also lives on.26 However, none of this can disguise
the fact that the old affectivity has gone, as the first post-independence generation of
French and African leaders has handed over to a new generation of political leaders.
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, President Gbagbo’s supporters promote Ivoirian nationalism with
talk of a ‘new decolonisation’ from France (Doza, 2003). Even in Senegal, whose links
with France stretch back to the seventeenth century and whose special relationship
with France was personified by its first president, who became an agre´ge´ and a member
of the Acade´mie Franc¸aise, the new generation of political leaders under Abdoulaye
Wade has sought to diversify the country’s foreign relations in order to reduce
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dependency on France (Chafer, 2003). More generally, the new generation of African
leaders has become increasingly irritated by, and less willing to accept, France’s self-
proclaimed role as Africa’s advocate on the world stage. Meanwhile in Paris, old Africa
hands who worked for the former coope´ration ministry, whose careers were spent in
Africa and who both embodied the Franco-African special relationship and
constituted a reservoir of expertise on Africa, are retiring and not being replaced by
a new generation of Africa specialists. Moreover, with student visas increasingly
difficult to obtain, fewer and fewer students from the old pre´ carre´ are going to
university in France, often preferring to study in the USA instead (Sot, 2002). As a
result, the dense web of relationships that bound France to Africa and underpinned the
old ‘special relationship’ has declined.
In the light of this, two major questions arise. Is France and Africa still ‘a family
affair’? And if it is not, is ‘la Franc¸afrique’ still pertinent as a notion, harking back, as it
does, to an old, state-centred relationship with the pays du champ that was both
underpinned and promoted by a dense web of personal links and affinities? To be sure,
the conditions which enabled this special relationship to develop and endure for some
35 years after independence have gone for ever. Moreover, the old—pre-1990—aid
regime, which was about creating and maintaining dependency, has been replaced by a
new regime that is supposed to be about moving towards self-sufficiency and
promoting economic and political liberalism. Recognising this, France has adopted the
so-called ‘Abidjan doctrine’, which in effect ‘internationalises’ African countries’
economic dependency, insofar as they must have reached prior agreement with the
IMF if they wish to request French aid, while reducing the French state’s political
freedom of manoeuvre to pursue a distinctive African policy. All African countries in
the ZSP that have concluded an agreement with the IMF are now eligible for French
support. As a result, the term ‘la Franc¸afrique’, encapsulating the notion of a family-
like relationship, is increasingly inappropriate. The old Franco-African bloc is
definitively splintered and France, it seems clear, is in the process of abandoning its old
‘family’ relationship with Africa in favour of a more pragmatic, more hard-nosed—
and more fashionable—case-by-case approach to its African relations.
Notes
[1] Originally coined by Houphoue¨t-Boigny, the term ‘Franc¸afrique’ has come to denote the illicit,
often corrupt, nature of Franco-African relations; see Verschave, 1998. The other terms are
used respectively by La Lettre du Continent, passim; Bourmaud, 1996, p. 433; and Dozon, 2003,
pp. 231–278.
[2] The origin of the term ‘re´seaux’ lies in the Gaullist Resistance networks coordinated by Foccart
during the Second World War.
[3] See for example Pierre Pe´an (1984) on the relationship between Gabon’s Bongo family and the
Elf oil company, in ‘Proce`s Elf: la politique perdue de rue’, Libe´ration, 15 Nov., 2003.
[4] Le Monde Diplomatique, Apr. 2000, p. 24.
[5] Le Monde Diplomatique, Mar. 1998, pp. 20–21.
[6] Africa Confidential, 8 Mar. 2002, pp. 6–7.
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[7] ‘Le retour des Mitterrand’s boys sur l’Afrique’, La Lettre du Continent, 18 Jan. 2001.
[8] Rwanda was not originally part of the ‘family’ as it is an ex-Belgian colony.
[9] ‘Quand Hassan II cite Jean Jaure`s . . .’, Le Monde, 9 May 1996.
[10] Africa Confidential, 20 June 1997, pp. 3–4.
[11] ‘Le de´part de l’arme´e franc¸aise . . .’, Le Monde, 20 Aug. 1997.
[12] Interview with J.-F. Bayart, La Croix, 27 Dec. 1999.
[13] ‘M. Chirac de´fend un monde multipolaire’, Le Monde, 24 Sept. 2003.
[14] ‘Chirac l’Africain’, Afrique-Asie, Mar. 2002, p. 7.
[15] See http://www.senat.fr: ‘Projet de loi de finances pour 2002- Tome III’ and ‘Projet de loi de
finances pour 2001- Tome IV’.
[16] Le Monde Diplomatique, Mar. 1998, p. 21.
[17] Africa Confidential, 6 Dec. 2002, pp. 5–6; ‘Mission spe´ciale Niger/Mali’, La Lettre du Continent,
23 Oct. 2003.
[18] Paris/Luanda relations have been soured by the “Angolagate” affair involving illicit arms sales to
Angola, see Africa Confidential, 9 Mar. 2001, p. 8.
[19] ‘Monopoles prive´s de l’eau et de l’e´lectricite´’, La Lettre du Continent, 1 Feb. 2001;
‘Bollore´/Maersk: entente cordiale sur le rail’, La Lettre du Continent, 8 Nov. 2001.
[20] Personal communication, 24 Aug. 2003.
[21] The recent military intervention in Coˆte d’Ivoire appears to contradict this, although this can
be explained by the necessity to protect the large (20,000) French community and France’s
extensive economic interests, rather than by any renewed French enthusiasm for intervening in
Africa. It has support from the UN and the Economic Community of West African States.
[22] Dominique de Villepin, speech to the IHEDN, 13 June 2003, available at: http://www.ihedn.fr/
Pages/Pages_Actu/FICA2003_Discours.html.
[23] French aid to Senegal declined from 82m euros in 1999 to 36.3m in 2002; see Africa
Confidential, 25 June 2004, p. 7.
[24] The budget forecast for 2004 is that 138.5m euros will be allocated to the C2D. The first five
countries to sign C2D agreements with France were: Mozambique, Uganda, Bolivia, Tanzania
and Mauritania; those expected to qualify in 2004 are Rwanda, Malawi, Nicaragua, Cameroon,
Ghana, Madagascar and Honduras; see http://www.senat.fr/rap/a03-076-3/a-03-076-314.html.
[25] Cumming, 2001, pp. 150, 377; Smith, 2004. According to Smith less than 1% of French
development aid was channelled via NGOs in 2001—‘cinq fois moins que ses voisins’ —and
only a quarter of French NGO spending went to Africa, down from 46% in 1999.
[26] For example at the 2003 Franco-African summit (Ayad, 2003).
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